MetaMask Snap Audit Report For Pianity

Management Summary

Pianity contacted Sayfer Security in order to perform a security audit on Pianity’s MetaMask Snap in July 2023.

Before assessing the above services, we held a kickoff meeting with the Pianity technical team and received an overview of the system and the goals for this research.

Over the research period of 2 weeks, we discovered 7 vulnerabilities in the system.

In conclusion, several fixes should be implemented following the report, but the system’s security posture is competent.

Risk Methodology

At Sayfer, we are committed to delivering the highest quality penetration testing to our clients. That’s why we have implemented a comprehensive risk assessment model to evaluate the severity of our findings and provide our clients with the best possible recommendations for mitigation.

Our risk assessment model is based on two key factors: IMPACT and LIKELIHOOD. Impact refers to the potential harm that could result from an issue, such as financial loss, reputational damage, or a non-operational system. Likelihood refers to the probability that an issue will occur, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the attack and the number of potential attackers.

By combining these two factors, we can create a comprehensive understanding of the risk posed by a particular issue and provide our clients with a clear and actionable assessment of the severity of the issue. This approach allows us to prioritize our recommendations and ensure that our clients receive the best possible advice on how to protect their business.

Risk is defined as follows:

Vulnerabilities by Risk

High – Direct threat to key business processes.
Medium – Indirect threat to key business processes or partial threat to business processes.
Low – No direct threat exists. The vulnerability may be exploited using other vulnerabilities.
Informational – This finding does not indicate vulnerability, but states a comment that notifies about design flaws and improper implementation that might cause a problem in the long run.

Severity
# of issues
High
0
Medium
0
Low
2
Informational
5

Approach

Introduction

Pianity contacted Sayfer to perform penetration testing on Pianity’s MetaMask Snap application.

This report documents the research carried out by Sayfer targeting the selected resources defined under the research scope. Particularly, this report displays the security posture review for Pianity’s MetaMask Snap application and its surrounding infrastructure and process implementations

Our penetration testing project life cycle:

01

Scope Overview

02

Technical Overview

03

Scope Validation

04

Threat Model

05

Security Evaluation

06

Security Assessment

Scope Overview

During our first meeting and after understanding the company’s needs, we defined the application’s scope that resides at the following URLs as the scope of the project:

  • Pianity’s MetaMask Snap Application
    Audit commit: 25e87c1f663ec591345b0a468006132a1c0b6157
    Fixes commit: c8b9fc2ca579cabf422b6bf122314e9378fa2658

Our tests were performed from July to August 2023

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Scope Validation

We began by ensuring that the scope defined to us by the client was technically logical. Deciding what scope is right for a given system is part of the initial discussion. Getting the scope right is key to deriving maximum business value from the research.

Threat Model

During our kickoff meetings with the client we defined the most important assets the application possesses.

We defined that the largest current threat to the system is sensitive user information

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Security Evaluation Methodology

Sayfer uses OWASP WSTG as our technical standard when reviewing web applications. After gaining a thorough understanding of the system we decided which OWASP tests are required to evaluate the system.

Security Assessment

After understanding and defining the scope, performing threat modeling, and evaluating the correct tests required in order to fully check the application for security flaws, we performed our security assessment.

Issue Table Description

Issue title

ID The OWASP ID of the issue. Additional tests that we conduct and are not included in
the OWASP table will have Sayfer ID.
Example ID: WSTG-INFO-002
WSTG – Web Security Test Guide.
INFO – A shorthand for the topic to which the issue belongs.
002 – Issue number.
Risk Represents the risk factor of the issue. For further description refer to the Vulnerabilities by Risk section.
Required Skill Describes the skill level required to conduct successful exploitation. The lower the skill level the easier the exploitation process.
OWASP Reference A link to the relevant OWASP page for further knowledge.
Location The URL in which this issue was detected. Issues with no location have no particular location and refer to the product as a whole.
Tools The tools used to detect the issue.

Description

Here we provide a brief description of the issue and how it formed, the steps we made to find or exploit it, along with proof of concept (if present), and how this issue can affect the product or its users.

Mitigation

Suggested resolving options for this issue and links to advised sites for further remediation.

Security Evaluation

The following tests were conducted while auditing the system

Information Gathering

Information Gathering Test Name
WSTG-INFO-01 Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage
WSTG-INFO-02 Fingerprint Web Server
WSTG-INFO-03 Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage
WSTG-INFO-04 Enumerate Applications on Webserver
WSTG-INFO-05 Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage
WSTG-INFO-06 Identify application entry points
WSTG-INFO-07 Map execution paths through application
WSTG-INFO-08 Fingerprint Web Application Framework
WSTG-INFO-09 Fingerprint Web Application
WSTG-INFO-10 Map Application Architecture

Configuration and Deploy Management Testing

Configuration and Deploy Management Testing Test Name
WSTG-CONF-01 Test Network Infrastructure Configuration
WSTG-CONF-02 Test Application Platform Configuration
WSTG-CONF-03 Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information
WSTG-CONF-04 Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information
WSTG-CONF-05 Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces
WSTG-CONF-06 Test HTTP Methods
WSTG-CONF-07 Test HTTP Strict Transport Security
WSTG-CONF-08 Test RIA cross domain policy
WSTG-CONF-09 Test File Permission
WSTG-CONF-10 Test for Subdomain Takeover
WSTG-CONF-11 Test Cloud Storage

Identity Management Testing

Identity Management Testing Test Name
WSTG-IDNT-01 Test Role Definitions
WSTG-IDNT-02 Test User Registration Process
WSTG-IDNT-03 Test Account Provisioning Process
WSTG-IDNT-04 Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account
WSTG-IDNT-05 Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy

Authentication Testing

Authentication Testing Test Name
WSTG-ATHN-01 Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel
WSTG-ATHN-02 Testing for Default Credentials
WSTG-ATHN-03 Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism
WSTG-ATHN-04 Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema
WSTG-ATHN-05 Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password
WSTG-ATHN-06 Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses
WSTG-ATHN-07 Testing for Weak Password Policy
WSTG-ATHN-08 Testing for Weak Security Question Answer
WSTG-ATHN-09 Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities
WSTG-ATHN-10 Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel

Authorization Testing

Authorization Testing Test Name
WSTG-ATHZ-01 Testing Directory Traversal File Include
WSTG-ATHZ-02 Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema
WSTG-ATHZ-03 Testing for Privilege Escalation
WSTG-ATHZ-04 Testing for Insecure Direct Object References

Session Management Testing

Session Management Testing Test Name
WSTG-SESS-01 Testing for Session Management Schema
WSTG-SESS-02 Testing for Cookies Attributes
WSTG-SESS-03 Testing for Session Fixation
WSTG-SESS-04 Testing for Exposed Session Variables
WSTG-SESS-05 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery
WSTG-SESS-06 Testing for Logout Functionality
WSTG-SESS-07 Testing Session Timeout
WSTG-SESS-08 Testing for Session Puzzling
WSTG-SESS-09 Testing for Session Hijacking

Data Validation Testing

Data Validation Testing Test Name
WSTG-INPV-01 Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting
WSTG-INPV-02 Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting
WSTG-INPV-03 Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering
WSTG-INPV-04 Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution
WSTG-INPV-05 Testing for SQL Injection
WSTG-INPV-06 Testing for LDAP Injection
WSTG-INPV-07 Testing for XML Injection
WSTG-INPV-08 Testing for SSI Injection
WSTG-INPV-09 Testing for XPath Injection
WSTG-INPV-10 Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection
WSTG-INPV-11 Testing for Code Injection
WSTG-INPV-12 Testing for Command Injection
WSTG-INPV-13 Testing for Format String Injection
WSTG-INPV-14 Testing for Incubated Vulnerability
WSTG-INPV-15 Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling
WSTG-INPV-16 Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests
WSTG-INPV-17 Testing for Host Header Injection
WSTG-INPV-18 Testing for Server-side Template Injection
WSTG-INPV-19 Testing for Server-Side Request Forgery

Error Handling

Error Handling Test Name
WSTG-ERRH-01 Testing for Improper Error Handling
WSTG-ERRH-02 Testing for Stack Traces

Cryptography

Cryptography Test Name
WSTG-CRYP-01 Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security
WSTG-CRYP-02 Testing for Padding Oracle
WSTG-CRYP-03 Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels
WSTG-CRYP-04 Testing for Weak Encryption

Business logic Testing

Business logic Testing Test Name
WSTG-BUSL-01 Test Business Logic Data Validation
WSTG-BUSL-02 Test Ability to Forge Requests
WSTG-BUSL-03 Test Integrity Checks
WSTG-BUSL-04 Test for Process Timing
WSTG-BUSL-05 Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits
WSTG-BUSL-06 Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows
WSTG-BUSL-07 Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use
WSTG-BUSL-08 Test Upload of Unexpected File Types
WSTG-BUSL-09 Test Upload of Malicious Files

Client Side Testing

Client Side Testing Test Name
WSTG-CLNT-01 Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting
WSTG-CLNT-02 Testing for JavaScript Execution
WSTG-CLNT-03 Testing for HTML Injection
WSTG-CLNT-04 Testing for Client Side URL Redirect
WSTG-CLNT-05 Testing for CSS Injection
WSTG-CLNT-06 Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation
WSTG-CLNT-07 Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing
WSTG-CLNT-08 Testing for Cross Site Flashing
WSTG-CLNT-09 Testing for Clickjacking
WSTG-CLNT-10 Testing WebSockets
WSTG-CLNT-11 Test Web Messaging
WSTG-CLNT-12 Testing Browser Storage
WSTG-CLNT-13 Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion

API Testing

API Testing Test Name
WSTG-APIT-01 Testing GraphQL

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    Security Assessment Findings

    Arsnap/Adapter

    Usage Of Vulnerable Packages

    ID SAY-01
    Status Fixed
    Risk Low
    Business Impact There is no discernable direct impact, but it’s still advisable to update this package.
    Location

    Description

    An pnpm audit command has revealed that the package semver is considered vulnerable to a regex denial of service attack. See more here.

    Mitigation

    It’s advisable to upgrade the package to 6.3.1 or later, as this vulnerability was already fixed.

     

    Low Log Limit

    ID SAY-02
    Status Fixed
    Risk Low
    Business Impact Logs are supposed to debug the program. If they have too short of a memory, their usefulness may be reduced.
    Location packages/arsnap/src/state.ts:52

    Description

    The logsStorageLimit variable will work only for a few usages of snap – 100 entries except is_enabled and get_permissions methods are only allowed. Above 100, the oldest entry will be silently overwritten without using the return value from logs.splice().

    registerLog:

    if (logs.unshift(entry) > logsStorageLimit) {
    logs.splice(logsStorageLimit, logs.length - logsStorageLimit);
    }

    Mitigation

    Considering the size of the logs as text data, a better solution is to increase their allowable size, for example to 1000.

     

    Unhelpful Error Message

    ID SAY-03
    Status Fixed
    Risk Informational
    Business Impact Non-descriptive error messages such as this are simply not helpful. Not for developers, nor for users. They can thus reduce both readability and maintainability.
    Location packages/arsnap/src/index.ts:56; getLogInfo()

    Description

    getLogInfo(), supports all available public methods as part of the log logging process. If the `method` variable does not find its equivalent in switch, it goes to default, i.e. the exhaustive function is returned. However, this function returns a non-descriptive error message, which may be misleading.

    ● exhaustive():

    export function exhaustive(_: never): never {
    throw new Error("Check wasn't exhaustive");
    }

    Mitigation

    The error message should be made more specific.

     

    Misleading Return Value

    ID SAY-04
    Status Fixed
    Risk Informational
    Business Impact If anything, whether now or in the future, relies on that return value, it may be unhelpful and confusing in that specific case.
    Location packages/arsnap/src/permissions.rs:50; requestPermissions()

    Description

    requestPermissions(), used to handle requests for new permissions for the dApp from the user, verifies whether the requested permissions are not already granted. If this is true for all requested permissions, newPermissions is of length zero, as no new permission will be granted. However, even when no new permissions have been granted, the value of the granted parameter is returned as true.

    requestPermissions():

    if (newPermissions.length === 0) {
    return { granted: true, permissions: currentPermissions };
    }

    Mitigation

    One possibility is to change granted to something other than a boolean. An enum with three values is the most obvious choice: one value for true, a second for false, and a neutral third, that means that no new permissions have been granted, but nothing was denied.

     

    TODOs in the Code

    ID SAY-05
    Status Fixed
    Risk Informational
    Business Impact TODO comments are obviously harmless, but they may appear unprofessional in a production environment.
    Location

    Description

    We found a few cases of left-over TODOs around the codebase.
    Occurrences:
    – packages/adapter/src/const.ts:1
    – packages/adapter/src/const.ts:5
    – packages/arsnap/src/handlers.ts:196
    – packages/arsnap/src/state.ts:50

    Mitigation

    Simply remove the comments.

     

    Usage of Deprecated Functions

    ID SAY-06
    Status Fixed
    Risk Informational
    Business Impact Although there is no risk associated with these functions, it still won’t hurt to switch them out.
    Location

    Description

    It has been noticed that functions marked as deprecated are used in several places in Snap.

    Affected functions include:

    • atob(),
      packages/arsnap/src/crypto.ts:45
      packages/arsnap/src/utils.ts:23
    • btoa()
      packages/arsnap/src/utils.ts:18

    Mitigation

    Please refer to this Stack Overflow thread for more information.

     

    Vault

    Missing Summary Field in CreateOperation

    ID SAY-07
    Status Fixed
    Risk Informational
    Business Impact There is no direct impact associated with this finding, we still recommend maintaining consistency in your code.
    Location plugin/keys/backend.go:36; KeyPath()

    Description

    The logical.CreateOperation path in KeyPath is not implementing the Summary field like the rest of the operations within OperationHandler.

    Notice how most operations implement a Summary field, but CreateOperation does not:

    Operations: map[logical.Operation]framework.OperationHandler{
    logical.ReadOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
    Callback: handleRead,
    Summary: "Retrieve the secret from the map.",
    },
    logical.UpdateOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
    Callback: handleWrite,
    Summary: "Store a secret at the specified location.",
    },
    logical.CreateOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
    Callback: handleWrite,
    },
    logical.DeleteOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
    Callback: handleDelete,
    Summary: "Deletes the secret at the specified location.",
    },
    },

    Mitigation

    Add the missing Summary field.

    Appendix A: Security Evaluation Fixes

    After a review by the Sayfer team, we certify that all the above-mentioned security issues have been addressed by the Pianity team.

    Fixes commit: c8b9fc2ca579cabf422b6bf122314e9378fa2658

    You can find more information about it on our Blog

    Sayfer’s blog focuses on web3, security, and vulnerability research. We believe that in the cybersecurity industry it’s crucial to stay up to date on the latest trends and advancements. Currently, our team of experienced researchers enjoys researching cutting-edge blockchain and web3 technologies.
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