Management Summary
NuFi contacted Sayfer Security in order to perform penetration testing on NuFi’s MetaMask Snap in 04/2024.
Before assessing the above services, we held a kickoff meeting with the NuFi technical team and received an overview of the system and the goals for this research.
Over the research period of 2 weeks, we discovered 2 vulnerabilities in the system.
In conclusion, several fixes should be implemented following the report, but the system’s security posture is competent.
After a review by the Sayfer team, we certify that all the security issues mentioned in this report have been addressed by the NuFi team.
Risk Methodology
At Sayfer, we are committed to delivering the highest quality penetration testing to our clients. That’s why we have implemented a comprehensive risk assessment model to evaluate the severity of our findings and provide our clients with the best possible recommendations for mitigation.
Our risk assessment model is based on two key factors: IMPACT and LIKELIHOOD. Impact refers to the potential harm that could result from an issue, such as financial loss, reputational damage, or a non-operational system. Likelihood refers to the probability that an issue will occur, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the attack and the number of potential attackers.
By combining these two factors, we can create a comprehensive understanding of the risk posed by a particular issue and provide our clients with a clear and actionable assessment of the severity of the issue. This approach allows us to prioritize our recommendations and ensure that our clients receive the best possible advice on how to protect their business.
Risk is defined as follows:
Vulnerabilities by Risk
High – Direct threat to key business processes.
Medium – Indirect threat to key business processes or partial threat to business processes.
Low – No direct threat exists. The vulnerability may be exploited using other vulnerabilities.
Informational – This finding does not indicate vulnerability, but states a comment that notifies about design flaws and improper implementation that might cause a problem in the long run.
Approach
Security Evaluation Methodology
Sayfer uses OWASP WSTG as our technical standard when reviewing web applications. After gaining a thorough understanding of the system we decided which OWASP tests are required to evaluate the system.
Security Assessment
After understanding and defining the scope, performing threat modeling, and evaluating the correct tests required in order to fully check the application for security flaws, we performed our security assessment.
Issue Table Description
Issue title
ID | SAY-??: An ID for easy communication on each vulnerability |
Status | Open/Fixed/Acknowledged |
Risk | Represents the risk factor of the issue. For further description refer to the Vulnerabilities by Risk section. |
Business Impact | The main risk of the vulnerability at a business level. |
Location | The URL or the file in which this issue was detected. Issues with no location have no particular location and refer to the product as a whole. |
Description
Here we provide a brief description of the issue and how it formed, the steps we made to find or exploit it, along with proof of concept (if present), and how this issue can affect the product or its users.
Mitigation
Suggested resolving options for this issue and links to advised sites for further remediation.
Security Evaluation
The following tests were conducted while auditing the system
Information Gathering
Information Gathering | Test Name |
WSTG-INFO-01 | Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage |
WSTG-INFO-02 | Fingerprint Web Server |
WSTG-INFO-03 | Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage |
WSTG-INFO-04 | Enumerate Applications on Webserver |
WSTG-INFO-05 | Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage |
WSTG-INFO-06 | Identify application entry points |
WSTG-INFO-07 | Map execution paths through application |
WSTG-INFO-08 | Fingerprint Web Application Framework |
WSTG-INFO-09 | Fingerprint Web Application |
WSTG-INFO-10 | Map Application Architecture |
Configuration and Deploy Management Testing
Configuration and Deploy Management Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-CONF-01 | Test Network Infrastructure Configuration |
WSTG-CONF-02 | Test Application Platform Configuration |
WSTG-CONF-03 | Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information |
WSTG-CONF-04 | Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information |
WSTG-CONF-05 | Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces |
WSTG-CONF-06 | Test HTTP Methods |
WSTG-CONF-07 | Test HTTP Strict Transport Security |
WSTG-CONF-08 | Test RIA cross domain policy |
WSTG-CONF-09 | Test File Permission |
WSTG-CONF-10 | Test for Subdomain Takeover |
WSTG-CONF-11 | Test Cloud Storage |
Identity Management Testing
Identity Management Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-IDNT-01 | Test Role Definitions |
WSTG-IDNT-02 | Test User Registration Process |
WSTG-IDNT-03 | Test Account Provisioning Process |
WSTG-IDNT-04 | Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account |
WSTG-IDNT-05 | Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy |
Authentication Testing
Authentication Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-ATHN-01 | Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel |
WSTG-ATHN-02 | Testing for Default Credentials |
WSTG-ATHN-03 | Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism |
WSTG-ATHN-04 | Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema |
WSTG-ATHN-05 | Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password |
WSTG-ATHN-06 | Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses |
WSTG-ATHN-07 | Testing for Weak Password Policy |
WSTG-ATHN-08 | Testing for Weak Security Question Answer |
WSTG-ATHN-09 | Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities |
WSTG-ATHN-10 | Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel |
Authorization Testing
Authorization Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-ATHZ-01 | Testing Directory Traversal File Include |
WSTG-ATHZ-02 | Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema |
WSTG-ATHZ-03 | Testing for Privilege Escalation |
WSTG-ATHZ-04 | Testing for Insecure Direct Object References |
Session Management Testing
Session Management Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-SESS-01 | Testing for Session Management Schema |
WSTG-SESS-02 | Testing for Cookies Attributes |
WSTG-SESS-03 | Testing for Session Fixation |
WSTG-SESS-04 | Testing for Exposed Session Variables |
WSTG-SESS-05 | Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery |
WSTG-SESS-06 | Testing for Logout Functionality |
WSTG-SESS-07 | Testing Session Timeout |
WSTG-SESS-08 | Testing for Session Puzzling |
WSTG-SESS-09 | Testing for Session Hijacking |
Data Validation Testing
Data Validation Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-INPV-01 | Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting |
WSTG-INPV-02 | Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting |
WSTG-INPV-03 | Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering |
WSTG-INPV-04 | Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution |
WSTG-INPV-05 | Testing for SQL Injection |
WSTG-INPV-06 | Testing for LDAP Injection |
WSTG-INPV-07 | Testing for XML Injection |
WSTG-INPV-08 | Testing for SSI Injection |
WSTG-INPV-09 | Testing for XPath Injection |
WSTG-INPV-10 | Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection |
WSTG-INPV-11 | Testing for Code Injection |
WSTG-INPV-12 | Testing for Command Injection |
WSTG-INPV-13 | Testing for Format String Injection |
WSTG-INPV-14 | Testing for Incubated Vulnerability |
WSTG-INPV-15 | Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling |
WSTG-INPV-16 | Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests |
WSTG-INPV-17 | Testing for Host Header Injection |
WSTG-INPV-18 | Testing for Server-side Template Injection |
WSTG-INPV-19 | Testing for Server-Side Request Forgery |
Error Handling
Error Handling | Test Name |
WSTG-ERRH-01 | Testing for Improper Error Handling |
WSTG-ERRH-02 | Testing for Stack Traces |
Cryptography
Cryptography | Test Name |
WSTG-CRYP-01 | Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security |
WSTG-CRYP-02 | Testing for Padding Oracle |
WSTG-CRYP-03 | Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels |
WSTG-CRYP-04 | Testing for Weak Encryption |
Business logic Testing
Business logic Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-BUSL-01 | Test Business Logic Data Validation |
WSTG-BUSL-02 | Test Ability to Forge Requests |
WSTG-BUSL-03 | Test Integrity Checks |
WSTG-BUSL-04 | Test for Process Timing |
WSTG-BUSL-05 | Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits |
WSTG-BUSL-06 | Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows |
WSTG-BUSL-07 | Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use |
WSTG-BUSL-08 | Test Upload of Unexpected File Types |
WSTG-BUSL-09 | Test Upload of Malicious Files |
Client Side Testing
Client Side Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-CLNT-01 | Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting |
WSTG-CLNT-02 | Testing for JavaScript Execution |
WSTG-CLNT-03 | Testing for HTML Injection |
WSTG-CLNT-04 | Testing for Client Side URL Redirect |
WSTG-CLNT-05 | Testing for CSS Injection |
WSTG-CLNT-06 | Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation |
WSTG-CLNT-07 | Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing |
WSTG-CLNT-08 | Testing for Cross Site Flashing |
WSTG-CLNT-09 | Testing for Clickjacking |
WSTG-CLNT-10 | Testing WebSockets |
WSTG-CLNT-11 | Test Web Messaging |
WSTG-CLNT-12 | Testing Browser Storage |
WSTG-CLNT-13 | Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion |
API Testing
API Testing | Test Name |
WSTG-APIT-01 | Testing GraphQL |
Order audit from Sayfer
Security Assessment Findings
No Warning on Signing Arbitrary Data
ID | SAY-01 |
Status | Fixed |
Risk | Low |
Business Impact | Increased probability of attacks against users involving signing arbitrary data. |
Location | – …/src/api/cardano__signData/ui.ts:7; renderSignData() |
Description
When signing arbitrary data, users might sign an off-chain approval or transaction data that can be later used for malicious activities. Therefore, it is worth reminding users that they should be confident that they understand what they are signing before commiting. It does not seem that any such warning is present.
- …/src/index.ts has a method of signing arbitrary data:
- Which is later defined in …/cardano__signData/index.ts:
- Finally, renderSignData() is defined in …/cardano__signData/ui.ts:
As you can see, the requested data is simply displayed and the user can sign it.
Mitigation
It is recommended to attach an additional warning for the user before letting them sign arbitrary data.
Floating Dependency Versions
ID | SAY-02 |
Status | Fixed |
Risk | Low |
Business Impact | Not pinning dependencies to exact versions opens up the possibility of dependency (supply chain) attacks. Such attacks have already been successfully executed in the past, for instance, against the BitPay wallet. |
Location | – package.json:36-60 |
Description
External dependencies of the snap are not pinned to an exact version but are instead set to a compatible version (ˆx.x.x).
- json:36-60
[...]
"axios": "^0.28.0",
"webpack-dev-middleware": "^5.3.4"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@lavamoat/allow-scripts": "^3.0.0",
"@lavamoat/preinstall-always-fail": "^2.0.0",
"@metamask/eslint-config": "^12.0.0",
"@metamask/eslint-config-jest": "^12.0.0",
"@metamask/eslint-config-nodejs": "^12.0.0",
"@metamask/eslint-config-typescript": "^12.0.0",
"@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^5.42.1",
"@typescript-eslint/parser": "^5.42.1",
"eslint": "^8.45.0",
"eslint-config-prettier": "^8.5.0",
"eslint-plugin-import": "~2.26.0",
"eslint-plugin-jest": "^27.1.5",
"eslint-plugin-jsdoc": "^41.1.2",
"eslint-plugin-n": "^15.7.0",
"eslint-plugin-prettier": "^4.2.1",
"eslint-plugin-promise": "^6.1.1",
"prettier": "^2.7.1",
"prettier-plugin-packagejson": "^2.2.18",
"sharp": "^0.32.6",
"typescript": "^4.7.4"
},
[...]
Mitigation
Pin dependencies to exact versions (=x.x.x), rather than indicating a minimally compatible one (ˆx.x.x).