Management Summary
Pianity contacted Sayfer Security in order to perform a security audit on Pianity’s MetaMask Snap in July 2023.
Before assessing the above services, we held a kickoff meeting with the Pianity technical team and received an overview of the system and the goals for this research.
Over the research period of 2 weeks, we discovered 7 vulnerabilities in the system.
In conclusion, several fixes should be implemented following the report, but the system’s security posture is competent.
Risk Methodology
At Sayfer, we are committed to delivering the highest quality penetration testing to our clients. That’s why we have implemented a comprehensive risk assessment model to evaluate the severity of our findings and provide our clients with the best possible recommendations for mitigation.
Our risk assessment model is based on two key factors: IMPACT and LIKELIHOOD. Impact refers to the potential harm that could result from an issue, such as financial loss, reputational damage, or a non-operational system. Likelihood refers to the probability that an issue will occur, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the attack and the number of potential attackers.
By combining these two factors, we can create a comprehensive understanding of the risk posed by a particular issue and provide our clients with a clear and actionable assessment of the severity of the issue. This approach allows us to prioritize our recommendations and ensure that our clients receive the best possible advice on how to protect their business.
Risk is defined as follows:

Vulnerabilities by Risk
High – Direct threat to key business processes.
Medium – Indirect threat to key business processes or partial threat to business processes.
Low – No direct threat exists. The vulnerability may be exploited using other vulnerabilities.
Informational – This finding does not indicate vulnerability, but states a comment that notifies about design flaws and improper implementation that might cause a problem in the long run.
| Severity | # of issues |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Medium | 0 |
| Low | 2 |
| Informational | 5 |
Approach
Introduction
Pianity contacted Sayfer to perform penetration testing on Pianity’s MetaMask Snap application.
This report documents the research carried out by Sayfer targeting the selected resources defined under the research scope. Particularly, this report displays the security posture review for Pianity’s MetaMask Snap application and its surrounding infrastructure and process implementations
Our penetration testing project life cycle:
Scope Overview
Technical Overview
Scope Validation
Threat Model
Security Evaluation
Security Assessment
Scope Overview
During our first meeting and after understanding the company’s needs, we defined the application’s scope that resides at the following URLs as the scope of the project:
- Pianity’s MetaMask Snap Application
Audit commit: 25e87c1f663ec591345b0a468006132a1c0b6157
Fixes commit: c8b9fc2ca579cabf422b6bf122314e9378fa2658
Our tests were performed from July to August 2023
Scope Validation
We began by ensuring that the scope defined to us by the client was technically logical. Deciding what scope is right for a given system is part of the initial discussion. Getting the scope right is key to deriving maximum business value from the research.
Threat Model
During our kickoff meetings with the client we defined the most important assets the application possesses.
We defined that the largest current threat to the system is sensitive user information
Security Evaluation Methodology
Sayfer uses OWASP WSTG as our technical standard when reviewing web applications. After gaining a thorough understanding of the system we decided which OWASP tests are required to evaluate the system.
Security Assessment
After understanding and defining the scope, performing threat modeling, and evaluating the correct tests required in order to fully check the application for security flaws, we performed our security assessment.
Issue Table Description
Issue title
| ID | The OWASP ID of the issue. Additional tests that we conduct and are not included in the OWASP table will have Sayfer ID. Example ID: WSTG-INFO-002 WSTG – Web Security Test Guide. INFO – A shorthand for the topic to which the issue belongs. 002 – Issue number. |
| Risk | Represents the risk factor of the issue. For further description refer to the Vulnerabilities by Risk section. |
| Required Skill | Describes the skill level required to conduct successful exploitation. The lower the skill level the easier the exploitation process. |
| OWASP Reference | A link to the relevant OWASP page for further knowledge. |
| Location | The URL in which this issue was detected. Issues with no location have no particular location and refer to the product as a whole. |
| Tools | The tools used to detect the issue. |
Description
Here we provide a brief description of the issue and how it formed, the steps we made to find or exploit it, along with proof of concept (if present), and how this issue can affect the product or its users.
Mitigation
Suggested resolving options for this issue and links to advised sites for further remediation.
Security Evaluation
The following tests were conducted while auditing the system
Information Gathering
| Information Gathering | Test Name |
| WSTG-INFO-01 | Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage |
| WSTG-INFO-02 | Fingerprint Web Server |
| WSTG-INFO-03 | Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage |
| WSTG-INFO-04 | Enumerate Applications on Webserver |
| WSTG-INFO-05 | Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage |
| WSTG-INFO-06 | Identify application entry points |
| WSTG-INFO-07 | Map execution paths through application |
| WSTG-INFO-08 | Fingerprint Web Application Framework |
| WSTG-INFO-09 | Fingerprint Web Application |
| WSTG-INFO-10 | Map Application Architecture |
Configuration and Deploy Management Testing
| Configuration and Deploy Management Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-CONF-01 | Test Network Infrastructure Configuration |
| WSTG-CONF-02 | Test Application Platform Configuration |
| WSTG-CONF-03 | Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information |
| WSTG-CONF-04 | Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information |
| WSTG-CONF-05 | Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces |
| WSTG-CONF-06 | Test HTTP Methods |
| WSTG-CONF-07 | Test HTTP Strict Transport Security |
| WSTG-CONF-08 | Test RIA cross domain policy |
| WSTG-CONF-09 | Test File Permission |
| WSTG-CONF-10 | Test for Subdomain Takeover |
| WSTG-CONF-11 | Test Cloud Storage |
Identity Management Testing
| Identity Management Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-IDNT-01 | Test Role Definitions |
| WSTG-IDNT-02 | Test User Registration Process |
| WSTG-IDNT-03 | Test Account Provisioning Process |
| WSTG-IDNT-04 | Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account |
| WSTG-IDNT-05 | Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy |
Authentication Testing
| Authentication Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-ATHN-01 | Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel |
| WSTG-ATHN-02 | Testing for Default Credentials |
| WSTG-ATHN-03 | Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism |
| WSTG-ATHN-04 | Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema |
| WSTG-ATHN-05 | Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password |
| WSTG-ATHN-06 | Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses |
| WSTG-ATHN-07 | Testing for Weak Password Policy |
| WSTG-ATHN-08 | Testing for Weak Security Question Answer |
| WSTG-ATHN-09 | Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities |
| WSTG-ATHN-10 | Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel |
Authorization Testing
| Authorization Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-ATHZ-01 | Testing Directory Traversal File Include |
| WSTG-ATHZ-02 | Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema |
| WSTG-ATHZ-03 | Testing for Privilege Escalation |
| WSTG-ATHZ-04 | Testing for Insecure Direct Object References |
Session Management Testing
| Session Management Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-SESS-01 | Testing for Session Management Schema |
| WSTG-SESS-02 | Testing for Cookies Attributes |
| WSTG-SESS-03 | Testing for Session Fixation |
| WSTG-SESS-04 | Testing for Exposed Session Variables |
| WSTG-SESS-05 | Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery |
| WSTG-SESS-06 | Testing for Logout Functionality |
| WSTG-SESS-07 | Testing Session Timeout |
| WSTG-SESS-08 | Testing for Session Puzzling |
| WSTG-SESS-09 | Testing for Session Hijacking |
Data Validation Testing
| Data Validation Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-INPV-01 | Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting |
| WSTG-INPV-02 | Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting |
| WSTG-INPV-03 | Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering |
| WSTG-INPV-04 | Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution |
| WSTG-INPV-05 | Testing for SQL Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-06 | Testing for LDAP Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-07 | Testing for XML Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-08 | Testing for SSI Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-09 | Testing for XPath Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-10 | Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-11 | Testing for Code Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-12 | Testing for Command Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-13 | Testing for Format String Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-14 | Testing for Incubated Vulnerability |
| WSTG-INPV-15 | Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling |
| WSTG-INPV-16 | Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests |
| WSTG-INPV-17 | Testing for Host Header Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-18 | Testing for Server-side Template Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-19 | Testing for Server-Side Request Forgery |
Error Handling
| Error Handling | Test Name |
| WSTG-ERRH-01 | Testing for Improper Error Handling |
| WSTG-ERRH-02 | Testing for Stack Traces |
Cryptography
| Cryptography | Test Name |
| WSTG-CRYP-01 | Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security |
| WSTG-CRYP-02 | Testing for Padding Oracle |
| WSTG-CRYP-03 | Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels |
| WSTG-CRYP-04 | Testing for Weak Encryption |
Business logic Testing
| Business logic Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-BUSL-01 | Test Business Logic Data Validation |
| WSTG-BUSL-02 | Test Ability to Forge Requests |
| WSTG-BUSL-03 | Test Integrity Checks |
| WSTG-BUSL-04 | Test for Process Timing |
| WSTG-BUSL-05 | Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits |
| WSTG-BUSL-06 | Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows |
| WSTG-BUSL-07 | Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use |
| WSTG-BUSL-08 | Test Upload of Unexpected File Types |
| WSTG-BUSL-09 | Test Upload of Malicious Files |
Client Side Testing
| Client Side Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-CLNT-01 | Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting |
| WSTG-CLNT-02 | Testing for JavaScript Execution |
| WSTG-CLNT-03 | Testing for HTML Injection |
| WSTG-CLNT-04 | Testing for Client Side URL Redirect |
| WSTG-CLNT-05 | Testing for CSS Injection |
| WSTG-CLNT-06 | Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation |
| WSTG-CLNT-07 | Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing |
| WSTG-CLNT-08 | Testing for Cross Site Flashing |
| WSTG-CLNT-09 | Testing for Clickjacking |
| WSTG-CLNT-10 | Testing WebSockets |
| WSTG-CLNT-11 | Test Web Messaging |
| WSTG-CLNT-12 | Testing Browser Storage |
| WSTG-CLNT-13 | Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion |
API Testing
| API Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-APIT-01 | Testing GraphQL |
Security Assessment Findings
Arsnap/Adapter
Usage Of Vulnerable Packages
| ID | SAY-01 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Low |
| Business Impact | There is no discernable direct impact, but it’s still advisable to update this package. |
| Location | – |
Description
An pnpm audit command has revealed that the package semver is considered vulnerable to a regex denial of service attack. See more here.
Mitigation
It’s advisable to upgrade the package to 6.3.1 or later, as this vulnerability was already fixed.
Low Log Limit
| ID | SAY-02 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Low |
| Business Impact | Logs are supposed to debug the program. If they have too short of a memory, their usefulness may be reduced. |
| Location | packages/arsnap/src/state.ts:52 |
Description
The logsStorageLimit variable will work only for a few usages of snap – 100 entries except is_enabled and get_permissions methods are only allowed. Above 100, the oldest entry will be silently overwritten without using the return value from logs.splice().
registerLog:
if (logs.unshift(entry) > logsStorageLimit) {
logs.splice(logsStorageLimit, logs.length - logsStorageLimit);
}
Mitigation
Considering the size of the logs as text data, a better solution is to increase their allowable size, for example to 1000.
Unhelpful Error Message
| ID | SAY-03 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | Non-descriptive error messages such as this are simply not helpful. Not for developers, nor for users. They can thus reduce both readability and maintainability. |
| Location | packages/arsnap/src/index.ts:56; getLogInfo() |
Description
getLogInfo(), supports all available public methods as part of the log logging process. If the `method` variable does not find its equivalent in switch, it goes to default, i.e. the exhaustive function is returned. However, this function returns a non-descriptive error message, which may be misleading.
● exhaustive():
export function exhaustive(_: never): never {
throw new Error("Check wasn't exhaustive");
}
Mitigation
The error message should be made more specific.
Misleading Return Value
| ID | SAY-04 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | If anything, whether now or in the future, relies on that return value, it may be unhelpful and confusing in that specific case. |
| Location | packages/arsnap/src/permissions.rs:50; requestPermissions() |
Description
requestPermissions(), used to handle requests for new permissions for the dApp from the user, verifies whether the requested permissions are not already granted. If this is true for all requested permissions, newPermissions is of length zero, as no new permission will be granted. However, even when no new permissions have been granted, the value of the granted parameter is returned as true.
requestPermissions():
if (newPermissions.length === 0) {
return { granted: true, permissions: currentPermissions };
}
Mitigation
One possibility is to change granted to something other than a boolean. An enum with three values is the most obvious choice: one value for true, a second for false, and a neutral third, that means that no new permissions have been granted, but nothing was denied.
TODOs in the Code
| ID | SAY-05 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | TODO comments are obviously harmless, but they may appear unprofessional in a production environment. |
| Location | – |
Description
We found a few cases of left-over TODOs around the codebase.
Occurrences:
– packages/adapter/src/const.ts:1
– packages/adapter/src/const.ts:5
– packages/arsnap/src/handlers.ts:196
– packages/arsnap/src/state.ts:50
Mitigation
Simply remove the comments.
Usage of Deprecated Functions
| ID | SAY-06 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | Although there is no risk associated with these functions, it still won’t hurt to switch them out. |
| Location | – |
Description
It has been noticed that functions marked as deprecated are used in several places in Snap.
Affected functions include:
- atob(),
packages/arsnap/src/crypto.ts:45
packages/arsnap/src/utils.ts:23 - btoa()
packages/arsnap/src/utils.ts:18
Mitigation
Please refer to this Stack Overflow thread for more information.
Vault
Missing Summary Field in CreateOperation
| ID | SAY-07 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | There is no direct impact associated with this finding, we still recommend maintaining consistency in your code. |
| Location | plugin/keys/backend.go:36; KeyPath() |
Description
The logical.CreateOperation path in KeyPath is not implementing the Summary field like the rest of the operations within OperationHandler.
Notice how most operations implement a Summary field, but CreateOperation does not:
Operations: map[logical.Operation]framework.OperationHandler{
logical.ReadOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
Callback: handleRead,
Summary: "Retrieve the secret from the map.",
},
logical.UpdateOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
Callback: handleWrite,
Summary: "Store a secret at the specified location.",
},
logical.CreateOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
Callback: handleWrite,
},
logical.DeleteOperation: &framework.PathOperation{
Callback: handleDelete,
Summary: "Deletes the secret at the specified location.",
},
},
Mitigation
Add the missing Summary field.
Appendix A: Security Evaluation Fixes
After a review by the Sayfer team, we certify that all the above-mentioned security issues have been addressed by the Pianity team.
Fixes commit: c8b9fc2ca579cabf422b6bf122314e9378fa2658
