Management Summary

Hathor contacted Sayfer Security in order to perform penetration testing on Hathor’s MetaMask Snap in 09/2025.

Before assessing the above services, we held a kickoff meeting with the Hathor technical team and received an overview of the system and the goals for this research.

Over the research period of 2 weeks, we discovered 4 vulnerabilities in the system.

In conclusion, several fixes should be implemented following the report, but the system’s security posture is competent.

After a review by the Sayfer team, we certify that all the security issues mentioned in this report have been addressed by the Hathor team.

Risk Methodology

At Sayfer, we are committed to delivering the highest quality penetration testing to our clients. That’s why we have implemented a comprehensive risk assessment model to evaluate the severity of our findings and provide our clients with the best possible recommendations for mitigation.

Our risk assessment model is based on two key factors: IMPACT and LIKELIHOOD. Impact refers to the potential harm that could result from an issue, such as financial loss, reputational damage, or a non-operational system. Likelihood refers to the probability that an issue will occur, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the attack and the number of potential attackers.

By combining these two factors, we can create a comprehensive understanding of the risk posed by a particular issue and provide our clients with a clear and actionable assessment of the severity of the issue. This approach allows us to prioritize our recommendations and ensure that our clients receive the best possible advice on how to protect their business.

Risk is defined as follows:

Vulnerabilities by Risk

High – Direct threat to key business processes.
Medium – Indirect threat to key business processes or partial threat to business processes.
Low – No direct threat exists. The vulnerability may be exploited using other vulnerabilities.
Informational – This finding does not indicate vulnerability, but states a comment that notifies about design flaws and improper implementation that might cause a problem in the long run.

Severity# of issues
Low2
Medium2
High0
Informational0

Approach

Introduction

Hathor contacted Sayfer to perform penetration testing on their MetaMask Snap application

This report documents the research carried out by Sayfer targeting the selected resources defined under the research scope. Particularly, this report displays the security posture review for Hathor’s MetaMask Snap application and its surrounding infrastructure and process implementations.

Our penetration testing project life cycle:

01

Scope Overview

02

Technical Overview

03

Scope Validation

04

Threat Model

05

Security Evaluation

06

Security Assessment

Scope Overview

During our first meeting and after understanding the company’s needs, we defined the application’s scope that resides at the following URLs as the scope of the project:

Our tests were performed from 07/09/2025 to 21/09/2025.

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Scope Validation

We began by ensuring that the scope defined to us by the client was technically logical.
Deciding what scope is right for a given system is part of the initial discussion. Getting the scope right is key to deriving maximum business value from the research.

Threat Model

During our kickoff meetings with the client we defined the most important assets the application possesses.
We defined that the largest current threat to the system is the potential for attackers to siphon funds from the user’s wallet.

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Security Evaluation Methodology

Sayfer uses OWASP WSTG as our technical standard when reviewing web applications. After gaining a thorough understanding of the system we decided which OWASP tests are required to evaluate the system.

Security Assessment

After understanding and defining the scope, performing threat modeling, and evaluating the correct tests required in order to fully check the application for security flaws, we performed our security assessment.

Issue Table Description

Issue title

ID SAY-??: An ID for easy communication on each vulnerability
Status Open/Fixed/Acknowledged
Risk Represents the risk factor of the issue. For further description refer to the Vulnerabilities by Risk section.
Business Impact The main risk of the vulnerability at a business level.
Location The URL or the file in which this issue was detected. Issues with no location have no particular location and refer to the product as a whole.

Description

Here we provide a brief description of the issue and how it formed, the steps we made to find or exploit it, along with proof of concept (if present), and how this issue can affect the product or its users.

Mitigation

Suggested resolving options for this issue and links to advised sites for further remediation.

Security Evaluation

The following tests were conducted while auditing the system

Information Gathering

Information Gathering Test Name Status
WSTG-INFO-01 Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage Pass
WSTG-INFO-02 Fingerprint Web Server Pass
WSTG-INFO-03 Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage Pass
WSTG-INFO-04 Enumerate Applications on Webserver Pass
WSTG-INFO-05 Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage Pass
WSTG-INFO-06 Identify application entry points Pass
WSTG-INFO-07 Map execution paths through application Pass
WSTG-INFO-08 Fingerprint Web Application Framework Pass
WSTG-INFO-09 Fingerprint Web Application Pass
WSTG-INFO-10 Map Application Architecture Pass

Configuration and Deploy Management Testing

Configuration and Deploy Management Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-CONF-01 Test Network Infrastructure Configuration Pass
WSTG-CONF-02 Test Application Platform Configuration Pass
WSTG-CONF-03 Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information Pass
WSTG-CONF-04 Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information Pass
WSTG-CONF-05 Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces Pass
WSTG-CONF-06 Test HTTP Methods Pass
WSTG-CONF-07 Test HTTP Strict Transport Security Pass
WSTG-CONF-08 Test RIA cross domain policy Pass
WSTG-CONF-09 Test File Permission Pass
WSTG-CONF-10 Test for Subdomain Takeover Pass
WSTG-CONF-11 Test Cloud Storage Pass

Identity Management Testing

Identity Management Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-IDNT-01 Test Role Definitions Pass
WSTG-IDNT-02 Test User Registration Process Pass
WSTG-IDNT-03 Test Account Provisioning Process Pass
WSTG-IDNT-04 Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account Pass
WSTG-IDNT-05 Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy Pass

Authentication Testing

Authentication Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-ATHN-01 Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel Pass
WSTG-ATHN-02 Testing for Default Credentials Pass
WSTG-ATHN-03 Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism Pass
WSTG-ATHN-04 Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema Pass
WSTG-ATHN-05 Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password Pass
WSTG-ATHN-06 Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses Pass
WSTG-ATHN-07 Testing for Weak Password Policy Pass
WSTG-ATHN-08 Testing for Weak Security Question Answer Pass
WSTG-ATHN-09 Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities Pass
WSTG-ATHN-10 Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel Pass

Authorization Testing

Authorization Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-ATHZ-01 Testing Directory Traversal File Include Pass
WSTG-ATHZ-02 Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema Pass
WSTG-ATHZ-03 Testing for Privilege Escalation Pass
WSTG-ATHZ-04 Testing for Insecure Direct Object References Pass

Session Management Testing

Session Management Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-SESS-01 Testing for Session Management Schema Pass
WSTG-SESS-02 Testing for Cookies Attributes Pass
WSTG-SESS-03 Testing for Session Fixation Pass
WSTG-SESS-04 Testing for Exposed Session Variables Pass
WSTG-SESS-05 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery Pass
WSTG-SESS-06 Testing for Logout Functionality Pass
WSTG-SESS-07 Testing Session Timeout Pass
WSTG-SESS-08 Testing for Session Puzzling Pass
WSTG-SESS-09 Testing for Session Hijacking Pass

Data Validation Testing

Data Validation Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-INPV-01 Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting Pass
WSTG-INPV-02 Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting Pass
WSTG-INPV-03 Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering Pass
WSTG-INPV-04 Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution Pass
WSTG-INPV-05 Testing for SQL Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-06 Testing for LDAP Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-07 Testing for XML Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-08 Testing for SSI Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-09 Testing for XPath Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-10 Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-11 Testing for Code Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-12 Testing for Command Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-13 Testing for Format String Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-14 Testing for Incubated Vulnerability Pass
WSTG-INPV-15 Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling Pass
WSTG-INPV-16 Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests Pass
WSTG-INPV-17 Testing for Host Header Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-18 Testing for Server-side Template Injection Pass
WSTG-INPV-19 Testing for Server-Side Request Forgery Pass

Error Handling

Error Handling Test Name Status
WSTG-ERRH-01 Testing for Improper Error Handling Pass
WSTG-ERRH-02 Testing for Stack Traces Pass

Cryptography

Cryptography Test Name Status
WSTG-CRYP-01 Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security Pass
WSTG-CRYP-02 Testing for Padding Oracle Pass
WSTG-CRYP-03 Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels Pass
WSTG-CRYP-04 Testing for Weak Encryption Pass

Business logic Testing

Business logic Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-BUSL-01 Test Business Logic Data Validation Pass
WSTG-BUSL-02 Test Ability to Forge Requests Pass
WSTG-BUSL-03 Test Integrity Checks Pass
WSTG-BUSL-04 Test for Process Timing Pass
WSTG-BUSL-05 Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits Pass
WSTG-BUSL-06 Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows Pass
WSTG-BUSL-07 Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use Pass
WSTG-BUSL-08 Test Upload of Unexpected File Types Pass
WSTG-BUSL-09 Test Upload of Malicious Files Pass

Client Side Testing

Client Side Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-CLNT-01 Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting Pass
WSTG-CLNT-02 Testing for JavaScript Execution Pass
WSTG-CLNT-03 Testing for HTML Injection Pass
WSTG-CLNT-04 Testing for Client Side URL Redirect Pass
WSTG-CLNT-05 Testing for CSS Injection Pass
WSTG-CLNT-06 Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation Pass
WSTG-CLNT-07 Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing Pass
WSTG-CLNT-08 Testing for Cross Site Flashing Pass
WSTG-CLNT-09 Testing for Clickjacking Pass
WSTG-CLNT-10 Testing WebSockets Pass
WSTG-CLNT-11 Test Web Messaging Pass
WSTG-CLNT-12 Testing Browser Storage Pass
WSTG-CLNT-13 Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion Pass

API Testing

API Testing Test Name Status
WSTG-APIT-01 Testing GraphQL Pass

Security Assessment Findings

Network change validation mismatch allows unvalidated persistence

ID SAY-01
Status Fixed
Risk Medium
Business Impact An attacker can pass validation with a correct params.newNetwork but persist a different, unvalidated data.newNetwork, leading to unexpected network switches and Snap malfunction.
Location – src/utils/prompt.ts:45

Description

The check validates params.newNetwork in NETWORK_MAP but, after approval, persists data.newNetwork. The setNetwork then writes whatever string is provided and reconfigures the wallet using it. Because the persisted value is later trusted by the configuration routine, a crafted request can desynchronize what the user saw versus what the Snap actually stored. This creates a reliable path to redirect network traffic or crash the Snap.

case TriggerTypes.ChangeNetworkConfirmationPrompt:
    if (!(params.newNetwork in NETWORK_MAP)) {
      // Reject if the newNetwork is not a valid option
      return { data: false };
    }
    approved = await changeNetworkPage(data, params, origin);
    if (approved) {
      await setNetwork(data.newNetwork);
    }
    return { data: approved };

Mitigation

We recommend adjusting the logic and using value from params instead.

 

Extended private keys (xpriv, authxpriv) are persisted in Snap state

ID SAY-02
Status Fixed
Risk Medium
Business Impact If any later flaw allows state access or exfiltration, the entire account hierarchy is compromised as storing raw xprivs increases the impact of such an attack, compared with on-demand derivation or storing only xpubs.
Location – src/utils/wallet.ts:48-63

Description

On first run, the Snap derives both account and auth extended private keys and writes them to persistent Snap state before constructing the wallet. While Snap state is encrypted at rest, storing master keys increases the consequences of any future bug that surfaces state content. In contrast, deriving on demand minimizes the time secrets exist in process memory and avoids long-term exposure.

accountPathXpriv = walletUtils.xprivFromData(
      Buffer.from(hathorNode.privateKey.substring(2), 'hex'),
      Buffer.from(hathorNode.chainCode.substring(2), 'hex'),
      hathorNode.parentFingerprint,
      hathorNode.depth,
      hathorNode.index,
      network
    );
    authPathXpriv = walletUtils.xprivFromData(
      Buffer.from(authHathorNode.privateKey.substring(2), 'hex'),
      Buffer.from(authHathorNode.chainCode.substring(2), 'hex'),
      authHathorNode.parentFingerprint,
      authHathorNode.depth,
      authHathorNode.index,
      network
    );

Mitigation

Avoid persisting xprivs and derive on-demand or persist only xpubs. If persistence is unavoidable, add an additional encryption layer and never expose these values via RPC.

 

Environment is not prepared for release

ID SAY-03
Status Fixed
Risk Low
Business Impact Readable source and dev-mode semantics lower the cost of reverse-engineering and may expose dev behavior or sensitive strings and logs in production.
Location – snap.config.ts

Description

The Webpack is forced to mode: ‘development’ with devtool: ‘source-map’, optimization.minimize: false, and the environment sets NODE_ENV: ‘development’. Source maps and readable bundles make it trivial to diff changes and discover internal assumptions or feature flags. This also increases the risk of accidentally shipping debug logs or test credentials.

Mitigation

Enable a production build through mode: ‘production’, remove source maps from the distributed artifact, enable minification, and ensure no dev-only code paths remain.

 

Prototype keys pass whitelist due to use of in operator

ID SAY-04
Status Fixed
Risk Low
Business Impact Prototype property names like, toString pass the check and can be used as “valid” keys, enabling misconfiguration or DoS when later dereferenced as network configs.
Location – src/utils/prompt.ts:38

Description

Validation uses params.newNetwork in NETWORK_MAP, which returns true for inherited keys. The NETWORK_MAP is a plain object, so prototype keys are included. In practice, strings like toString will pass validation even though they are not enumerated networks. When consumed as config keys later, these values resolve to undefined and induce runtime faults.

case TriggerTypes.ChangeNetworkConfirmationPrompt:
    if (!(params.newNetwork in NETWORK_MAP)) {
      // Reject if the newNetwork is not a valid option
      return { data: false };
    }

Mitigation

Use Object.hasOwn(NETWORK_MAP, key) or a set of allowed names to avoid inheriting prototype keys.