Management Summary

AnChain contacted Sayfer Security in order to perform a complete security audit on their Snap in 08/2023.

Before assessing the above services, we held a kickoff meeting with the AnChain technical team and received an overview of the system and the goals for this research.

Over the research period of 2 weeks, we discovered 6 vulnerabilities in the system.

Several fixes should be implemented following the report, but the system’s security posture is competent.

Risk Methodology

At Sayfer, we are committed to delivering the highest quality penetration testing to our clients. That’s why we have implemented a comprehensive risk assessment model to evaluate the severity of our findings and provide our clients with the best possible recommendations for mitigation.

Our risk assessment model is based on two key factors: IMPACT and LIKELIHOOD. Impact refers to the potential harm that could result from an issue, such as financial loss, reputational damage, or a non-operational system. Likelihood refers to the probability that an issue will occur, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the attack and the number of potential attackers.

By combining these two factors, we can create a comprehensive understanding of the risk posed by a particular issue and provide our clients with a clear and actionable assessment of the severity of the issue. This approach allows us to prioritize our recommendations and ensure that our clients receive the best possible advice on how to protect their business.

Risk is defined as follows:

Vulnerabilities by Risk

High – Direct threat to key business processes.
Medium – Indirect threat to key business processes or partial threat to business processes.
Low – No direct threat exists. The vulnerability may be exploited using other vulnerabilities.
Informational – This finding does not indicate vulnerability, but states a comment that notifies about design flaws and improper implementation that might cause a problem in the long run.

Severity# of issues
High1
Medium1
Low2
Informational2

Approach

Introduction

AnChain contacted Sayfer to perform complete white box penetration testing on the MetaMask Snap. This report documents the research carried out by Sayfer targeting the selected resources defined under the research scope. Particularly, this report displays the security posture review for the Snap application and its surrounding infrastructure and process implementations.

Scope Overview

During our first meeting and after understanding the company’s needs, we defined the application’s scope that resides at the following URLs as the scope of the project:

Our tests were performed from 15/08/2023 to 30/08/2023.

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Scope Validation

We began by ensuring that the scope defined to us by the client was technically logical. Deciding what scope is right for a given system is part of the initial discussion. Getting the scope right is key to deriving maximum business value from the research.

Threat Model

During our kickoff meetings with the client, we defined the most important assets the application possesses.

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Security Evaluation Methodology

Sayfer uses OWASP WSTG as our technical standard when reviewing web applications. After gaining a thorough understanding of the system we decided which OWASP tests are required to evaluate the system.

Security Assessment

After understanding and defining the scope, performing threat modeling, and evaluating the correct tests required in order to fully check the application for security flaws, we performed our security assessment.

Tools Used

During the test, we used multiple automated tools in addition to our manual tests, including the following: Burp Suite Professional, Web browser, DevTools, Nmap, Metasploit, SQLmap, Nessus, Shodan, Hydra, John the Ripper and wafw00f.

Issue Table Description

Issue title

ID The OWASP ID of the issue. Additional tests that we conduct and are not included in the OWASP table will have Sayfer ID.
Example ID: WSTG-INFO-002
WSTG – Web Security Test Guide.
INFO – A shorthand for the topic to which the issue belongs.
002 – Issue number.
Risk Represents the risk factor of the issue. For further description refer to the Vulnerabilities by Risk section.
Required Skill Describes the skill level required to conduct successful exploitation. The lower the skill level the easier the exploitation process.
OWASP
Reference
A link to the relevant OWASP page for further knowledge.
Location The URL in which this issue was detected. Issues with no location have no particular location and refer to the product as a whole.
Business Impact The impact of the findings on the system

Description

Here we provide a brief description of the issue and how it formed, the steps we made to find or exploit it, along with proof of concept (if present), and how this issue can affect the product or its users. .

Mitigation

Suggested resolving options for this issue and links to advised sites for further remediation.

Security Evaluation

The following tests were conducted while auditing the system

Information Gathering

Information Gathering Test Name
WSTG-INFO-01 Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage
WSTG-INFO-02 Fingerprint Web Server
WSTG-INFO-03 Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage
WSTG-INFO-04 Enumerate Applications on Webserver
WSTG-INFO-05 Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage
WSTG-INFO-06 Identify application entry points
WSTG-INFO-07 Map execution paths through application
WSTG-INFO-08 Fingerprint Web Application Framework
WSTG-INFO-09 Fingerprint Web Application
WSTG-INFO-10 Map Application Architecture

Configuration and Deploy Management Testing

Configuration and Deploy Management Testing Test Name
WSTG-CONF-01 Test Network Infrastructure Configuration
WSTG-CONF-02 Test Application Platform Configuration
WSTG-CONF-03 Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information
WSTG-CONF-04 Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information
WSTG-CONF-05 Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces
WSTG-CONF-06 Test HTTP Methods
WSTG-CONF-07 Test HTTP Strict Transport Security
WSTG-CONF-08 Test RIA cross domain policy
WSTG-CONF-09 Test File Permission
WSTG-CONF-10 Test for Subdomain Takeover
WSTG-CONF-11 Test Cloud Storage

Identity Management Testing

Identity Management Testing Test Name
WSTG-IDNT-01 Test Role Definitions
WSTG-IDNT-02 Test User Registration Process
WSTG-IDNT-03 Test Account Provisioning Process
WSTG-IDNT-04 Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account
WSTG-IDNT-05 Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy

Authentication Testing

Authentication Testing Test Name
WSTG-ATHN-01 Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel
WSTG-ATHN-02 Testing for Default Credentials
WSTG-ATHN-03 Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism
WSTG-ATHN-04 Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema
WSTG-ATHN-05 Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password
WSTG-ATHN-06 Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses
WSTG-ATHN-07 Testing for Weak Password Policy
WSTG-ATHN-08 Testing for Weak Security Question Answer
WSTG-ATHN-09 Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities
WSTG-ATHN-10 Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel

Authorization Testing

Authorization Testing Test Name
WSTG-ATHZ-01 Testing Directory Traversal File Include
WSTG-ATHZ-02 Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema
WSTG-ATHZ-03 Testing for Privilege Escalation
WSTG-ATHZ-04 Testing for Insecure Direct Object References

Session Management Testing

Session Management Testing Test Name
WSTG-SESS-01 Testing for Session Management Schema
WSTG-SESS-02 Testing for Cookies Attributes
WSTG-SESS-03 Testing for Session Fixation
WSTG-SESS-04 Testing for Exposed Session Variables
WSTG-SESS-05 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery
WSTG-SESS-06 Testing for Logout Functionality
WSTG-SESS-07 Testing Session Timeout
WSTG-SESS-08 Testing for Session Puzzling
WSTG-SESS-09 Testing for Session Hijacking

Data Validation Testing

Data Validation Testing Test Name
WSTG-INPV-01 Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting
WSTG-INPV-02 Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting
WSTG-INPV-03 Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering
WSTG-INPV-04 Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution
WSTG-INPV-05 Testing for SQL Injection
WSTG-INPV-06 Testing for LDAP Injection
WSTG-INPV-07 Testing for XML Injection
WSTG-INPV-08 Testing for SSI Injection
WSTG-INPV-09 Testing for XPath Injection
WSTG-INPV-10 Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection
WSTG-INPV-11 Testing for Code Injection
WSTG-INPV-12 Testing for Command Injection
WSTG-INPV-13 Testing for Format String Injection
WSTG-INPV-14 Testing for Incubated Vulnerability
WSTG-INPV-15 Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling
WSTG-INPV-16 Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests
WSTG-INPV-17 Testing for Host Header Injection
WSTG-INPV-18 Testing for Server-side Template Injection
WSTG-INPV-19 Testing for Server-Side Request Forgery

Error Handling

Error Handling Test Name
WSTG-ERRH-01 Testing for Improper Error Handling
WSTG-ERRH-02 Testing for Stack Traces

Cryptography

Cryptography Test Name
WSTG-CRYP-01 Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security
WSTG-CRYP-02 Testing for Padding Oracle
WSTG-CRYP-03 Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels
WSTG-CRYP-04 Testing for Weak Encryption

Business logic Testing

Business logic Testing Test Name
WSTG-BUSL-01 Test Business Logic Data Validation
WSTG-BUSL-02 Test Ability to Forge Requests
WSTG-BUSL-03 Test Integrity Checks
WSTG-BUSL-04 Test for Process Timing
WSTG-BUSL-05 Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits
WSTG-BUSL-06 Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows
WSTG-BUSL-07 Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use
WSTG-BUSL-08 Test Upload of Unexpected File Types
WSTG-BUSL-09 Test Upload of Malicious Files

Client Side Testing

Client Side Testing Test Name
WSTG-CLNT-01 Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting
WSTG-CLNT-02 Testing for JavaScript Execution
WSTG-CLNT-03 Testing for HTML Injection
WSTG-CLNT-04 Testing for Client Side URL Redirect
WSTG-CLNT-05 Testing for CSS Injection
WSTG-CLNT-06 Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation
WSTG-CLNT-07 Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing
WSTG-CLNT-08 Testing for Cross Site Flashing
WSTG-CLNT-09 Testing for Clickjacking
WSTG-CLNT-10 Testing WebSockets
WSTG-CLNT-11 Test Web Messaging
WSTG-CLNT-12 Testing Browser Storage
WSTG-CLNT-13 Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion

API Testing

API Testing Test Name
WSTG-APIT-01 Testing GraphQL

Security Assessment Findings

Snap Hosted Locally

ID SAY-01
Status Fixed
Risk High
Location snap/src/index.ts:5
Business Impact The solution in its current form does not work properly.

Description

In its current form, Snap uses the endpoint variable with the hardcoded address of the local GraphQL server. However, when the solution is launched, such a server is not created – so no communication with GraphQL on the localhost can be carried out, and thus – the solution does not work.

Mitigation

We suggest changing the endpoint to an external server with a running GraphQL service or implementing a local server that supports three types of network communication.

 

Unexpected Success Message

ID SAY-02
Status Fixed
Risk Medium
Location snap/src/index.ts:94-99
Business Impact The user is incorrectly informed about success, even though an error occurred.

Description

It has been noticed that when using the “store” method, the API key is stored in Snap’s storage. After validation using the validateApiKey function, setApiKey is called on success, followed by a success message.

Otherwise, an alert is returned to the user using the displayAlert function, and then there is no return to terminate the function call. Therefore, its execution goes further and, as in the case when the key is valid, a success message is returned to the user.

if (validKey) {
    await setApiKey(request.params.apiKey)
} else {
    await displayAlert(
    'Invalid API Key',
    'The API Key attempted to be stored is invalid. Please try
    again.',
    )
}
return snap.request({
    method: 'snap_dialog',
    params: {
    type: 'alert',
    content: panel([
        text(`API Key stored successfully`),
        text(JSON.stringify(origin) + ' has successfully stored a valid api key in your local metamask storage'),
        ]),
    },
})

Mitigation

We suggest that if the validation was unsuccessful – return an error message and abort the execution of the function, for example by “throw new Error(‘Error’)”

 

Lack of Documentation

ID SAY-03
Status Fixed
Risk Low
Location Whole solution
Business Impact Lack of understanding of the solution, lack of clear installation instructions, the code has no explanations, which can be problematic for people reading it.

Description

It was found that the code does not have any technical documentation explaining its operation and content. In addition, there are no comments in the code other than the default ones (Metamask template) referring to individual sections of the code and explaining their functioning. In addition, there is no clear instruction for installing Snap in the README file or in any other file, which may be problematic for users who are new to this technology.

Mitigation

We suggest creating appropriate technical documentation, and installation instructions, and adding comments explaining individual Snap functionalities.

 

Wrong Fuction Name

ID SAY-04
Status Fixed
Risk Low
Location snap/src/index.ts:129
Business Impact This reduces the readability of the code and can be confusing for someone trying to understand it.

Description

The onRpcRequest handler accepts two methods – “store” and “fetchKey“. Based on its name, the fetchKey method is used to extract the API key from state and return it to the user.

Apparently, the function contains the right logic and is supposed to return a boolean. Then, the name is confusing and needs to be changed.

case 'fetchKey':
const persistedData = await snap.request({
    method: 'snap_manageState',
    params: { operation: 'get' },
})
if (
    persistedData == null ||
    !persistedData.hasOwnProperty('BEIKey') ||
    persistedData.BEIKey == null
) {
    return false
}
return true

Mitigation

We suggest modifying the function name to make it clear that it doesn’t return the key itself.

 

Unused Parameter

ID SAY-05
Status Fixed
Risk Informational
Location snap/src/index.ts:137
Business Impact Existence of unnecessary code, reducing the readability of Snap.

Description

It was found that the on Transaction handler takes transactionOrigin as a parameter, even though it doesn’t use it anywhere afterwards. This is redundant and it is good practice to implement support for variables that are used wherever they are.

Mitigation

We suggest removing the transactionOrigin pass-through if Snap’s logic doesn’t use it anywhere.

 

Missing Unit Tests

ID SAY-06
Status Fixed
Risk Informational
Location Whole solution
Business Impact No verification that Snap works properly and as expected.

Description

Snap has been found to have no form of unit testing any of its functionalities. It is good practice for the core parts of the code (and preferably all) to have an appropriate test code validating their operation and comparing them with the expected results.

Mitigation

We suggest creating appropriate unit tests to determine whether Snap works as expected.

Appendix A: Security Evaluation Fixes

After a review by the Sayfer team, we certify that all the above-mentioned security issues have been addressed by the AnChain team.

Sayfer certifies that there are no longer any major vulnerabilities in the AnChain project that could cause security problems.

Fixes commit: d69cfe0cdb3f00778cba3efc996e1230d5046fef