Management Summary
Amax contacted Sayfer Security in order to perform penetration testing on Amax’s MetaMask Snap in November 2023.
Before assessing the above services, we held a kickoff meeting with the Amax technical team and received an overview of the system and the goals for this research.
Over the research period of 2 weeks, we discovered 4 vulnerabilities in the system and added 2 informational notes.
In conclusion, several fixes should be implemented following the report, but the system’s security posture is competent.
After a review by the Sayfer team, we certify that all the security issues mentioned in this report have been addressed by the Amax team.
Risk Methodology
At Sayfer, we are committed to delivering the highest quality penetration testing to our clients. That’s why we have implemented a comprehensive risk assessment model to evaluate the severity of our findings and provide our clients with the best possible recommendations for mitigation.
Our risk assessment model is based on two key factors: IMPACT and LIKELIHOOD. Impact refers to the potential harm that could result from an issue, such as financial loss, reputational damage, or a non-operational system. Likelihood refers to the probability that an issue will occur, taking into account factors such as the complexity of the attack and the number of potential attackers.
By combining these two factors, we can create a comprehensive understanding of the risk posed by a particular issue and provide our clients with a clear and actionable assessment of the severity of the issue. This approach allows us to prioritize our recommendations and ensure that our clients receive the best possible advice on how to protect their business.
Risk is defined as follows:

Vulnerabilities by Risk
High – Direct threat to key business processes.
Medium – Indirect threat to key business processes or partial threat to business processes.
Low – No direct threat exists. The vulnerability may be exploited using other vulnerabilities.
Informational – This finding does not indicate vulnerability, but states a comment that notifies about design flaws and improper implementation that might cause a problem in the long run.
| Severity | # of issues |
|---|---|
| High | 0 |
| Medium | 1 |
| Low | 3 |
| Informational | 2 |
Approach
Introduction
Amax contacted Sayfer to perform penetration testing on their MetaMask Snap application.
This report documents the research carried out by Sayfer targeting the selected resources defined under the research scope. Particularly, this report displays the security posture review for Amax’s MetaMask Snap application and its surrounding infrastructure and process implementations.
Our penetration testing project life cycle:
Scope Overview
Technical Overview
Scope Validation
Threat Model
Security Evaluation
Security Assessment
Scope Overview
During our first meeting and after understanding the company’s needs, we defined the application’s scope that resides at the following URLs as the scope of the project:
- Amax’s MetaMask Snap
- Audit commit: dd242acd7a1e24bf11e3cd75f3325868e7175dba
- Fixes commit: 4f03e8417136be066229463f52a926b170f9e491
Our tests were performed from November to December 2023.
Scope Validation
We began by ensuring that the scope defined to us by the client was technically logical.
Deciding what scope is right for a given system is part of the initial discussion. Getting the scope right is key to deriving maximum business value from the research.
Threat Model
During our kickoff meetings with the client we defined the most important assets the application possesses.
We defined that the largest current threat to the system is the potential for malicious attackers to steal funds from other users.
Security Evaluation Methodology
Sayfer uses OWASP WSTG as our technical standard when reviewing web applications. After gaining a thorough understanding of the system we decided which OWASP tests are required to evaluate the system.
Security Assessment
After understanding and defining the scope, performing threat modeling, and evaluating the correct tests required in order to fully check the application for security flaws, we performed our security assessment.
Issue Table Description
Issue title
| ID | SAY-??: An ID for easy communication on each vulnerability |
| Status | Open/Fixed/Acknowledged |
| Risk | Represents the risk factor of the issue. For further description refer to the Vulnerabilities by Risk section. |
| Business Impact | The main risk of the vulnerability at a business level. |
| Location | The URL or the file in which this issue was detected. Issues with no location have no particular location and refer to the product as a whole. |
Description
Here we provide a brief description of the issue and how it formed, the steps we made to find or exploit it, along with proof of concept (if present), and how this issue can affect the product or its users.
Mitigation
Suggested resolving options for this issue and links to advised sites for further remediation.
Security Evaluation
The following tests were conducted while auditing the system
Information Gathering
| Information Gathering | Test Name |
| WSTG-INFO-01 | Conduct Search Engine Discovery Reconnaissance for Information Leakage |
| WSTG-INFO-02 | Fingerprint Web Server |
| WSTG-INFO-03 | Review Webserver Metafiles for Information Leakage |
| WSTG-INFO-04 | Enumerate Applications on Webserver |
| WSTG-INFO-05 | Review Webpage Content for Information Leakage |
| WSTG-INFO-06 | Identify application entry points |
| WSTG-INFO-07 | Map execution paths through application |
| WSTG-INFO-08 | Fingerprint Web Application Framework |
| WSTG-INFO-09 | Fingerprint Web Application |
| WSTG-INFO-10 | Map Application Architecture |
Configuration and Deploy Management Testing
| Configuration and Deploy Management Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-CONF-01 | Test Network Infrastructure Configuration |
| WSTG-CONF-02 | Test Application Platform Configuration |
| WSTG-CONF-03 | Test File Extensions Handling for Sensitive Information |
| WSTG-CONF-04 | Review Old Backup and Unreferenced Files for Sensitive Information |
| WSTG-CONF-05 | Enumerate Infrastructure and Application Admin Interfaces |
| WSTG-CONF-06 | Test HTTP Methods |
| WSTG-CONF-07 | Test HTTP Strict Transport Security |
| WSTG-CONF-08 | Test RIA cross domain policy |
| WSTG-CONF-09 | Test File Permission |
| WSTG-CONF-10 | Test for Subdomain Takeover |
| WSTG-CONF-11 | Test Cloud Storage |
Identity Management Testing
| Identity Management Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-IDNT-01 | Test Role Definitions |
| WSTG-IDNT-02 | Test User Registration Process |
| WSTG-IDNT-03 | Test Account Provisioning Process |
| WSTG-IDNT-04 | Testing for Account Enumeration and Guessable User Account |
| WSTG-IDNT-05 | Testing for Weak or unenforced username policy |
Authentication Testing
| Authentication Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-ATHN-01 | Testing for Credentials Transported over an Encrypted Channel |
| WSTG-ATHN-02 | Testing for Default Credentials |
| WSTG-ATHN-03 | Testing for Weak Lock Out Mechanism |
| WSTG-ATHN-04 | Testing for Bypassing Authentication Schema |
| WSTG-ATHN-05 | Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password |
| WSTG-ATHN-06 | Testing for Browser Cache Weaknesses |
| WSTG-ATHN-07 | Testing for Weak Password Policy |
| WSTG-ATHN-08 | Testing for Weak Security Question Answer |
| WSTG-ATHN-09 | Testing for Weak Password Change or Reset Functionalities |
| WSTG-ATHN-10 | Testing for Weaker Authentication in Alternative Channel |
Authorization Testing
| Authorization Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-ATHZ-01 | Testing Directory Traversal File Include |
| WSTG-ATHZ-02 | Testing for Bypassing Authorization Schema |
| WSTG-ATHZ-03 | Testing for Privilege Escalation |
| WSTG-ATHZ-04 | Testing for Insecure Direct Object References |
Session Management Testing
| Session Management Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-SESS-01 | Testing for Session Management Schema |
| WSTG-SESS-02 | Testing for Cookies Attributes |
| WSTG-SESS-03 | Testing for Session Fixation |
| WSTG-SESS-04 | Testing for Exposed Session Variables |
| WSTG-SESS-05 | Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery |
| WSTG-SESS-06 | Testing for Logout Functionality |
| WSTG-SESS-07 | Testing Session Timeout |
| WSTG-SESS-08 | Testing for Session Puzzling |
| WSTG-SESS-09 | Testing for Session Hijacking |
Data Validation Testing
| Data Validation Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-INPV-01 | Testing for Reflected Cross Site Scripting |
| WSTG-INPV-02 | Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting |
| WSTG-INPV-03 | Testing for HTTP Verb Tampering |
| WSTG-INPV-04 | Testing for HTTP Parameter Pollution |
| WSTG-INPV-05 | Testing for SQL Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-06 | Testing for LDAP Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-07 | Testing for XML Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-08 | Testing for SSI Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-09 | Testing for XPath Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-10 | Testing for IMAP SMTP Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-11 | Testing for Code Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-12 | Testing for Command Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-13 | Testing for Format String Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-14 | Testing for Incubated Vulnerability |
| WSTG-INPV-15 | Testing for HTTP Splitting Smuggling |
| WSTG-INPV-16 | Testing for HTTP Incoming Requests |
| WSTG-INPV-17 | Testing for Host Header Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-18 | Testing for Server-side Template Injection |
| WSTG-INPV-19 | Testing for Server-Side Request Forgery |
Error Handling
| Error Handling | Test Name |
| WSTG-ERRH-01 | Testing for Improper Error Handling |
| WSTG-ERRH-02 | Testing for Stack Traces |
Cryptography
| Cryptography | Test Name |
| WSTG-CRYP-01 | Testing for Weak Transport Layer Security |
| WSTG-CRYP-02 | Testing for Padding Oracle |
| WSTG-CRYP-03 | Testing for Sensitive Information Sent via Unencrypted Channels |
| WSTG-CRYP-04 | Testing for Weak Encryption |
Business logic Testing
| Business logic Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-BUSL-01 | Test Business Logic Data Validation |
| WSTG-BUSL-02 | Test Ability to Forge Requests |
| WSTG-BUSL-03 | Test Integrity Checks |
| WSTG-BUSL-04 | Test for Process Timing |
| WSTG-BUSL-05 | Test Number of Times a Function Can be Used Limits |
| WSTG-BUSL-06 | Testing for the Circumvention of Work Flows |
| WSTG-BUSL-07 | Test Defenses Against Application Mis-use |
| WSTG-BUSL-08 | Test Upload of Unexpected File Types |
| WSTG-BUSL-09 | Test Upload of Malicious Files |
Client Side Testing
| Client Side Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-CLNT-01 | Testing for DOM-Based Cross Site Scripting |
| WSTG-CLNT-02 | Testing for JavaScript Execution |
| WSTG-CLNT-03 | Testing for HTML Injection |
| WSTG-CLNT-04 | Testing for Client Side URL Redirect |
| WSTG-CLNT-05 | Testing for CSS Injection |
| WSTG-CLNT-06 | Testing for Client Side Resource Manipulation |
| WSTG-CLNT-07 | Test Cross Origin Resource Sharing |
| WSTG-CLNT-08 | Testing for Cross Site Flashing |
| WSTG-CLNT-09 | Testing for Clickjacking |
| WSTG-CLNT-10 | Testing WebSockets |
| WSTG-CLNT-11 | Test Web Messaging |
| WSTG-CLNT-12 | Testing Browser Storage |
| WSTG-CLNT-13 | Testing for Cross Site Script Inclusion |
API Testing
| API Testing | Test Name |
| WSTG-APIT-01 | Testing GraphQL |
Security Assessment Findings
Uninformative Confirmation Popup
| ID | SAY-01 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Medium |
| Business Impact | As the transaction’s specifics are not disclosed in the confirmation pop-up, users are unable to make a well-informed choice about approving the transaction. This lack of information could be exploited by malicious actors to deceive users into transferring assets to incorrect addresses or initiating destructive transactions. For instance, an ill-intentioned individual could mislead a user into invoking a token contract’s transfer method, aiming to deplete the user’s tokens. Unfortunately, due to the absence of details in the confirmation dialog, the user remains unaware of the transaction’s true nature. |
| Location | — packages/snap/src/index.ts:39; onRpcRequest(string, JsonRpcRequest) |
Description
When signing a transaction, the prompt displayed to the user only contains the string “Transaction Signature”, followed by actions’s keys, and only if the key is equal to “data” or “authorization”. The user does not have the opportunity to read the full data that he accepts as part of the transaction.
- onRpcRequest(string, JsonRpcRequest):
case 'signTransaction': {
const { actions, network, path, transactConfig } = request.params as any;
if (
await snap.request({
method: 'snap_dialog',
params: {
type: 'confirmation',
content: panel([
heading('Transaction Signature'),
...actionsUI(actions),
]),
},
})
) {
return await signTransaction(
actions,
network,
Number(path),
transactConfig,
);
}
throw new Error('User Canceled!');
}
Mitigation
We suggest that the user be given full information about what he or she is signing. If possible, put the main components of the transaction in a readable form so that even non-technical users can assess whether what they are signing is what they intended.
Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities
| ID | SAY-02 |
| Status | Acknowledged |
| Risk | Low |
| Business Impact | Since it’s difficult to assess the exact impact of these vulnerable dependencies, specifically because they are all second-order or higher subdependencies, we decided to include this finding as low. |
| Location | — |
Description
By running npm audit, we found out that the project is using a couple of packages with versions that are associated with known vulnerabilities, or were marked by their creators as dangerous. Below is a list of dependencies with high risk vulnerabilities:
- json5@1.0.2
- Fix available
- minimatch@3.0.5
- Fix available
- sharp@0.32.6
- Fix available via –force
- io-parser@4.04 – 4.2.2
- Fix available
- ua-parser-js@0.7.33
- Fix available
Mitigation
As you see in the list, all of these dependencies can be upgraded with the npm audit fix command to a safer version. We recommend running the command and making the necessary changes to the code in order to improve your overall security posture.
Type Checking Is not Uniform
| ID | SAY-03 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Low |
| Business Impact | Using the any type, the snap loses control over the initial type of the variable, which may have consequences in the dependent logic that implements it. |
| Location | – packages/snap/src/index.ts:32, 40, 64; |
Description
any type casting was sometimes used throughout the snap. This is considered a bad security practice, since it deprives us of important type information and may consequently lead to unexpected runtime errors when unexpected types are used.
Mitigation
When unsure about a type, they should be defined down using “unknown”, and then narrowed down by type guards.
Insufficient Test Coverage
| ID | SAY-04 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Low |
| Business Impact | Without a proper testing environment, malfunctions and/or bugs in the codebase may slip through unnoticed. |
| Location | – |
Description
It was found that the snap does not have any kind of testing scenarios covered. When running yarn test, a “TODO” is printed, which leads us to believe that test creation is planned for the future.
Mitigation
We recommend creating and maintaining testing scenarios covering as much code as possible.
Lack of Documentation and Commenting
| ID | SAY-05 |
| Status | Fixed |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | The lack of proper documentation and commenting may be perceived as unprofessional by some users. Users may also be weary about installing a snap whose exact functionality they do not quite understand. |
| Location | — |
Description
The README file and several generic articles are the only materials describing the snap and its functionalities. Additionally, these articles do not match the code and function names that are implemented.
Mitigation
Write a proper readme and make sure to comment the code.
Example dApp Only Has One Functionality Implemented
| ID | SAY-06 |
| Status | Acknowledged |
| Risk | Informational |
| Business Impact | Without a proper testing environment, malfunctions and/or bugs in the codebase may slip through unnoticed. |
| Location | — |
Description
The test page enabling the installation of the snap only implements one functionality – displaying the getAccounts operation output. Taking into account the small number of snap functionalities and their early state of development, implementing the transaction and message signing functionalities should not be too time-consuming.
Mitigation
We recommend that the Snap example be as complete as possible and allow you to test all of the snap’s functionalities.
